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Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 102 (Dec. 26, 2017)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: APPELLATE; DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION IMMUNITY
Summary
The Court determined that discretionary-function immunity does not apply to intentional tort and
bad faith claims. Under comity principles, the Franchise Tax Board was entitled to the $50,000 statutory
cap that would extend to Nevada businesses under NRS 41.035(1).2 The Court additionally recognized false
light invasion of privacy as a tort cause of action distinct from other privacy torts, and adopted the
Restatement’s sliding-scale approach in determining the amount of evidence necessary to establish a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Background
In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) read a newspaper article discussing
Gilbert Hyatt’s lucrative computer-chip patent and decided to review Hyatt’s 1991 tax returns. Hyatt’s tax
return did not claim moving expenses, but showed that he resided in California for nine months in 1991
before relocating to Las Vegas, Nevada. Only 3.5 percent of Hyatt’s income was reported on the California
return, and none of his patent’s licensing payments were reported as taxable income. Based on the
discrepancies, FTB opened a tax audit on Hyatt’s 1991 state income tax return.
FTB sent Hyatt notice that they were auditing him, including with the notice an information request
form requiring Hyatt to provide information related to his connections to California and Nevada and the
facts regarding his move to Las Vegas. The information request form contained a privacy notice stating that
“The Information Practices Act of 1977 and the federal Privacy Act require the Franchise Tax Board to tell
you why we ask you for information. The Operations and Compliance Divisions ask for tax return
information to carry out the Personal Income Tax Law of the State of California.”3 Additionally, the
notification stated that Hyatt could expect “Courteous treatment by FTB employees, Clear and concise
requests for information from the auditor assigned to your case, Confidential treatment of any personal and
financial information that you provide to us, Completion of the audit within a reasonable amount of time.”4
During the audit, FTB requested information and documents directly from Hyatt as well as
conducting interviews and receiving signed statements from Hyatt’s ex-wife, brother and daughter—all
estranged from Hyatt during the audit period. Hyatt provided FTB with names of un-estranged relatives,
including his son, but FTB did not interview those individuals. Additionally, FTB sent over 100 letters
demanding information to third parties including two Japanese companies that held licenses to Hyatt’s
patent, utility companies, newspapers, banks, and medical providers. Many of the letters contained Hyatt’s
home address, social security number, or both.
Upon conclusion of the audit, FTB determined that Hyatt had staged the September 1991 move to
Nevada, and had actually moved in April 1992. Based on these findings, FTB concluded that Hyatt owed
California $1.8 million in state income taxes plus penalties amounting to $1.4 million and an additional
$1.2 million in interest, totaling $4.5 million dollars.

1
2
3
4

By Rebecca L. Crooker.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (2011).
Opinion at 8.
Opinion at 8.

Based on the finding that Hyatt moved to Nevada in 1992 rather than 1991, FTB commenced a
second audit of Hyatt’s 1992 California income taxes. Hyatt, alleging he was a resident of Nevada in 1992,
had not filed a California tax return. FTB used the information gathered from the 1991 audit and sent a
solitary request for information to Hyatt regarding patent-licensing payments received in 1992. This second
audit showed that Hyatt owed California over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus additional
penalties.
Hyatt initiated formal challenges to the audits’ conclusions by filing two protests with FTB which
it handled simultaneously. FTB reviews protests for accuracy and the need for changes. After 11 years and
3 different FTB auditors, the protests upheld the audits and Hyatt initiated challenges in California and
Nevada courts.
Hyatt filed the Nevada lawsuit in 1998. The complaint included a claim for declaratory relief
regarding the timing of his move from California to Nevada as well as a claim for negligence and seven
intentional torts: invasion of privacy; intrusion upon seclusion; invasion of privacy; publicity of private
facts; invasion of privacy; false light; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud; breach of
confidential relationship and; abuse of process. Hyatt alleged that FTB committed the intentional torts
during the 1991 and 1992 audits.
FTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment, challenging the Nevada district court’s
jurisdiction of Hyatt’s declaratory relief. The district court agreed that the timing of Hyatt’s move to Nevada
and whether FTB had properly assessed taxes should be decided through the California administrative
process, and granted partial summary judgment in favor of FTB. Accordingly, the remaining litigation was
conducted with the stipulation that any determinations as to the audits’ accuracy were not part of Hyatt’s
tort action, and the jury could not make any findings as to audits’ conclusions or the timing of Hyatt’s move
to Nevada.
FTB also filed a motion for partial summary judgment to prevent Hyatt from pursuing alleged
economic damages. FTB, during the 1991 audit, sent letters and copies of licensing agreements to two
Japanese companies that held licenses to Hyatt’s patent. Hyatt alleged that the contents of the licensing
agreements were confidential and that FTB’s demand letters notified that Japanese companies that Hyatt
was under investigation—leading the Japanese companies to cease business dealings with Hyatt.
Hyatt’s evidence supporting his allegations included the fact that FTB sent the letters to the two
businesses, the businesses sent responses to FTB, and after their responses Hyatt received no further patentlicensing income. Hyatt also provided expert testimony that the Japanese business culture supported the
alleged chain of events. The district court found that Hyatt had no admissible evidence to support his
allegations and granted partial summary judgment in favor of FTB.
Additionally, FTB filed two writ petitions in 2000 asserting that it was entitled to complete
immunity in Nevada, identical to the immunity enjoyed under California law. FTB based this argument
under either sovereign immunity, the full faith and credit clause, or comity. The Court decided that FTB
was not entitled to complete immunity under either principal, but under comity, should be granted partial
immunity identical to what a Nevada government agency would receive. Because of this ruling, the Court
held that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but was not immune to the intentional tort
causes of action.5
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FTB appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the decisions that FTB
was not entitled to complete immunity, but under comity was entitled to partial immunity, and accordingly
Hyatt could continue to pursue his claims for intentional torts.
After a four-month jury trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt on all the intentional tort causes of
action with damages of $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy,
$1,085,281.56 as special damages for fraud in addition to $250 million for punitive damages and
prejudgment interest on the awarded damages for emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and fraud. Hyatt
then moved the district court for costs, and the district court assigned the motion to a special master. After
15 months of discovery, the special master recommended that Hyatt be awarded $2.5 million in costs, a
recommendation adopted by the district court.
FTB appealed from the district court’s final judgment and award of costs. Hyatt cross-appealed the
district court’s partial summary judgment that he could not seek alleged economic damages.
FTB petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari and the Court agreed to decide two
questions: 1) whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall,6 holding that holding, “that one State. . . can open the
doors of its courts to a private citizen's lawsuit against another State without the other State's consent,”7 and
2) “[w]hether the Constitution permits Nevada to award damages against California agencies under Nevada
law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances.”8
In response to the first question, the Court split 4-4, affirming Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction
over a California agency. In response to the second question, the Court held that subjecting a California
agency to higher damages than a Nevada agency “violate[d] the Constitution's requirement that Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”9 The Court remanded the decision to the Supreme Court of Nevada for further consideration in light
of its decision.
Discussion
The court began by discussing FTB’s appeal and whether it was entitled to discretionary-function
immunity, barring Hyatt’s causes of action. The court concluded that FTB was not immune from suit
because it was the tort was intentional and with other immunities, based on public policy, and turned to
each of Hyatt’s intentional tort causes of action and Nevada’s statutory cap on damages. The discussion
concluded by discussing Hyatt’s cross appeal challenging the district court’s partial summary judgment
precluding Hyatt from attempting to recover for alleged economic losses.
FTB is not immune from suit under comity because discretionary-function immunity in Nevada does not
protect Nevada's government or its employees from intentional torts and bad-faith conduct
Nevada has waived traditional sovereign immunity from tort liability, with some exceptions which
include discretionary-function immunity. Discretionary-function immunity arises under NRS 41.031 and
states that no action can be brought against the state or its employee “based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or preform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the State…
or of any… employee… , whether or not the discretion involved is abused.”10 This immunity is designed
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to prevent the judicial branch from “second-guessing," in a tort action, legislative and executive branch
decisions that are based on "social, economic, and political policy.”11
FTB argued that the principle of comity requires that Nevada extend its discretionary-function
immunity for Hyatt’s intentional tort claims. Comity is a legal principle whereby a forum state may give
effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state based in part on deference and respect for the other
state, but only so long as the other state's laws are not contrary to the policies of the forum state.12 This
principle is intended to foster good will between states, but the forum state has total discretion whether to
invoke comity. Because FTB would receive full immunity from tort actions arising from an audit in
California, it contended that it should receive the same immunity in Nevada, provided the immunity does
not violate Nevada’s public policies.
Discretionary-function immunity in Nevada
Nevada’s test for whether to grant a government entity or its employee discretionary-function
immunity has changed over time,13 and an exception to discretionary-function immunity for intentional
torts and bad-faith conduct was recognized in Falline v. GNLV Corp.14 The current test was adopted from
the federal Berkovitz-Gaubert two-part test. Under this test, discretionary-function immunity applies if the
government actions “(1) involve an element of individual judgment or choice and (2) [are] based on
considerations of social, economic, or political policy.”15 Nevada’s adoption of the Berkovitz-Gaubert test
dispensed with earlier tests, but whether the Falline exception still applied was not addressed by the Nevada
Supreme Court at that time.
In response to FTB’s writ petitions, the Court applied Falline to determine that FTB was entitled
to immunity for the negligence cause of action, but not the intentional tort causes of action. Since that
decision, the law of discretionary-function immunity changed and thus needed to be re-applied to Hyatt’s
intentional tort causes of action.
FTB argued that the adoption of the federal test overruled the Falline exception, while Hyatt
contended that the adoption of the federal test made no changes to the Falline exception and that
discretionary-function immunity does not apply to bad-faith misconduct. The court in Falline viewed the
exception to discretionary immunity broadly, determining that bad faith differs from an abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a person acts without justification within their scope of authority, while
bad faith “involves an implemented attitude that completely transcends the circumference of authority
granted’ to the actor.”
In Martinez v. Maruszczak, Nevada adopted the federal two-part test for determining whether
discretionary-function immunity applies. The first step is determining whether the government conduct
involves judgment: if a regulation or policy leaves the employee with no option but to comply with a
directive and the employee fails to comply, the discretionary-immunity exception does not apply to the
action because the employee acts without individual judgment or choice.16 If, however, the employee is
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free to exercise discretion when implementing a government directive, the test’s second step examines
whether the conduct is a policy-making decision. If “‘the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct
that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime,’ discretionary-function immunity
will not bar the claim.”17
Hyatt argued that an intentional tort fails to meet the two-part test because such conduct cannot be
policy-based or discretionary. FTB contended that the federal test abolished the Falline exception because
the federal test is objective rather than subjective.
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached different results, with some concluding that allegations
of bad-faith misconduct are irrelevant to determining whether immunity applies because the employee’s
subjective intent should not be a factor whatsoever. Other courts focus on whether the employee’s conduct
can be considered a policy-based decision—holding that intentional torts are not policy-based conduct.
These courts do not allow discretionary-function immunity with intentional torts if the government action
is unrelated to any possible policy purpose. The Court further considered other jurisdictions’ decisions for
their analysis.
Courts that decline to recognize bad-faith conduct that calls for an inquiry into an employee's
subjective intent
In Franklin Savings Corp. v. United States,18 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether
a bad-faith claim precluded application of discretionary-function immunity. The court focused on the
second part of the federal test, considering whether intentional misconduct barred discretionary-function
immunity under the federal test. The Franklin Savings court noted that the Supreme Court “repeatedly
insisted ... that [tort] claims are not vehicles to second-guess policymaking,”19 and observed that when
Berkovitz was modified in Gaubert, the inclusion into considering whether the challenged conduct was
“susceptible to policy analysis[,] . . served to emphasize that courts should not inquire into the actual state
of mind or decision-making process of federal officials charged with performing discretionary functions.”20
The court decided that discretionary-function immunity bars claims that are dependent on an
employee’s state of mind in performing “facially authorized acts,”21 concluding that the immunity could
not otherwise effectively function. However, the court noted that their holding created the “potentially
troubling effect”22 of creating an irrebuttable presumption that all government employees perform
discretionary functions in good faith. The holding created the potential to prevent relief in the case of an
official intentionally committing malicious conduct. However, the potential for preclusion of bad-faith
claims was outweighed by the benefit of providing immunity to employees to allow them to act without
fear of litigation.
Courts that consider whether an employee subjectively intended to further policy by his or her
conduct
Conversely, in Coulthurst v. United States,23 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
conduct that did not involve judgment or was based on policy considerations was not shielded by
discretionary-function immunity.
17
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Nevada’s Supreme Court explained that the difference between the Franklin Savings and
Coulthurst decisions stems from how broadly each court applied the statement in Gaubert that “[t]he focus
of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred. . . , but on the
nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.” Franklin Savings broadly
interpreted this statement to prevent any consideration of whether the questionable conduct was done with
malicious intent. Coulthurst used a narrow interpretation to conclude that a complaint alleging a
nondiscretionary decision that caused the injury was not grounded in public policy.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Falline was most consistent with Coulthurst’s holding
that intentional torts are acts “unrelated to any plausible policy objective” and that such acts do not involve
the kind of judgment that is intended to be shielded from “judicial second-guessing.” The Court confirmed
that NRS 41.032 does not shield government employees from intentional torts. Because a Nevada agency
would not receive immunity in identical circumstances, the Court declined to extend immunity to FTB
under comity principles, to avoid contravening Nevada policy.
Hyatt's intentional tort causes of action
Hyatt brought claims for intrusion upon seclusion, publicity of private facts, false light, breach of
confidential relationship, abuse of process, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court
reviewed each of these de novo.
Invasion of privacy causes of action
The tort of invasion of privacy is comprised of four different actions: “(a) unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another; or (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; or (c) unreasonable
publicity given to the other's private life; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public.”24 Hyatt’s claim involved intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and
false light invasion of privacy, with a jury awarding him $52 million for these torts. Because intrusion upon
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts overlap, the Court discussed the two claims together.
Intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts
Intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts require an objective expectation of
privacy. One defense to invasion of privacy torts, the “public records defense” arises if the defendant can
show that the information disclosed was contained in a court’s official records, and thus, are public facts.
Hyatt contended that FTB disclosed his name, address, and social security number to various
individuals and entities. FTB argued that the information had been disclosed in prior public records.
Hyatt’s name, address and social security number did appear in court documents from his divorce
and a probate case that occurred prior to the audits. Hyatt additionally disclosed this information in business
license applications completed long before the FTB disclosures occurred. Although Hyatt argued that the
earlier public disclosures occurred so long ago that his objective expectation of privacy was preserved, the
court has never allowed the length of time between public disclosure and the invasion of privacy to limit
the application of the public records defense.
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The court concluded that under the public records defense, Hyatt lacked an objective expectation
of privacy and therefore could not meet the requirements necessary to prevail upon the intrusion upon
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts causes of action, and the district court’s judgment was
reversed.
False light invasion of privacy
Hyatt asserted that FTB portrayed him in a false light by depicting him as a “tax cheat.” FTB,
however, asserted that Hyatt lacked any evidence to support his claim. The false light invasion of privacy
tort had never been explicitly recognized in Nevada, so the court turned to whether to adopt the cause of
action.
Adopting the false light invasion of privacy tort
The Restatement specifies that an action for false light arises when
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light . . . if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which the other would be
placed.25
The courts that have declined to adopt the tort of false light invasion of privacy have done so
because of the similarity to the tort of defamation. Most courts that have adopted the false light tort have
done so after determining that defamation and false light have distinct differences: defamation protects an
objective interest in one’s reputation while false light protects one’s subjective interest in “freedom from
injury to the person’s right to be left alone.” The protection provided by false light extends to situations
where false portrayal could be harmful, but does not rise to the level of defamation.
Conversely, courts that have declined to adopt the false light tort have done so because of the
substantial overlaps with defamation—both in the conduct and protected interests. Because the policy
behind tort law is to deter “socially wrongful conduct,” torts must be clearly defined. A tort that lacks clarity
could potentially chill First Amendment activities. These courts view defamation, appropriation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress as adequate to protect privacy interests.
Having considered the various approaches, the Court determined that a false light tort is necessary
to protect privacy interests, officially adopting it as a cause of action in Nevada. After recognizing false
light invasion of privacy, the Court turned to the analysis of Hyatt’s claim.
Hyatt's false light claim
Hyatt argued that FTB portrayed him in a false light by depicting him as a “tax cheat” through the
inclusion of his case on FTB’s litigation roster. The litigation roster was a publicly available roster
identifying the audit cases in which the protest and appeal process had been completed as well as the cases
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being currently litigated in court. FTB asserted that Hyatt failed to present evidence that anyone believed
he was a “tax cheat.”
FTB began to include Hyatt’s case on its litigation roster after Hyatt initiated litigation. Because
Hyatt was involved in litigation with FTB and failed to prove that the litigation roster contained any false
information, no evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that FTB portrayed Hyatt in a false light.
Therefore, the district court’s judgment was reversed.
Breach of confidential relationship
Perry v. Jordan set forth a breach of confidential relationship cause of action which arises “by
reason of kinship or professional, business, or social relationships between the parties.”26 FTB argued that
Hyatt could not establish that a confidential relationship existed, and thus could not prevail on a claim for
breach of a confidential relationship. Hyatt argued that a confidential relationship existed because FTB
promised to protect his confidential information, and that FTB’s position in relation to Hyatt during the
audits established the requisite confidential relationship.
Perry recognized that “a confidential relationship exists when a party gains the confidence of
another party and purports to advise or act consistently with the other party's interest,”27 and “[w]hen a
confidential relationship exists, the person in whom the special trust is placed owes a duty to the other party
similar to the duty of a fiduciary, requiring the person to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests
of the other party.”28
FTB argued that the relationship between a tax auditor and the auditee does not create the
confidential relationship set forth in Perry. Hyatt argued that FTB expressly promised to protect Hyatt’s
confidential information and failed to keep that promise.
The Court, however, determined that FTB’s duty was to protect the state of California’s interests
rather than Hyatt’s, rejecting Hyatt’s broad interpretation of the relationships which meet the Perry
requirement. Because Hyatt and FTB did not have the requisite confidential relationship, the cause of action
failed as a matter of law and the district court’s judgement was reversed.
Abuse of process
The plaintiff in an abuse of process claim must show “(1) an ulterior purpose by the defendants
other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful act in the use of the legal process not proper in the
regular conduct of the proceeding.”29 A successful claim shows “that the defendant ‘willfully and
improperly used the legal process to accomplish’ an ulterior purpose other than resolving a legal dispute.”30
FTB argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the abuse of process claim because
it never sought to judicially enforce compliance with the audit process. Hyatt responded that FTB
committed abuse of process when it sent demand for information forms to both companies and individuals
in Nevada who were not subject to California law.
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The Court held that FTB did not use any judicial compliance when demanding information or
otherwise completing the audit, and Hyatt therefore could not establish an abuse of process claim. Thus,
FTB was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the district court’s judgment was reversed.
Fraud
To prevail on a claim of fraud, the plaintiff must show “the defendant made a false representation
that the defendant knew or believed was false, that the defendant intended to persuade the plaintiff to act or
not act based on the representation, and that the plaintiff had reason to rely on the representation and
suffered damages.”31
Upon the commencement of Hyatt’s audit, FTB informed him that Hyatt could expect courteous
treatment from FTB employees, that the auditor would clearly and concisely request information, that
information provided would be treated by FTB as confidential, and that the audit would be completed within
a reasonable period of time.
FTB argued that these statements were insufficient to form the basis for a fraud claim, and even if
they were sufficient representations, no evidence showed that FTB knew the representations were false
when made. Further, FTB argued that Hyatt failed to prove reliance on the statements because his
compliance with the audit was required whether he relied on the statements or not. Hyatt contended that
FTB knowingly misrepresented its promises to protect his private information and treat him fairly.
The Court held that a reasonable person could determine that FTB made representations to Hyatt,
intending that Hyatt rely on them, and which FTB did not intend to fulfill. Although FTB told Hyatt it
would treat his information confidentially, Hyatt presented evidence at trial that FTB exposed his social
security number and the fact he was being audited to numerous individuals and entities. FTB furthermore
sent letters to multiple doctors with the same last name, believing one of the doctors provided treatment to
Hyatt, but failing to determine the treating physician before sending the letters. Furthermore, FTB took
eleven years before resolving Hyatt’s protest of the two audits resulting in an accrual of $8,000 in interest
per day for the outstanding taxes owed to California. During trial, Hyatt also presented evidence that the
main auditor on Hyatt’s audit made disparaging comments about Hyatt and his religion and was intent on
imposing an assessment against Hyatt. Additional evidence showed that FTB promoted a culture in which
tax assessments were the end goal of every audit.
The Court concluded that the evidence showed that FTB had improper motives in conducting
Hyatt’s audits and a reasonable person could conclude that FTB knowingly made fraudulent representations
with the intention Hyatt would rely on them. Because evidence supported each fraud element, FTB was not
entitled to judgement as a matter of law.
Fraud damages
In 1993, the time that Hyatt suffered his injuries, NRS 41.03532 set a statutory cap on damages of
$50,000. Initially, the Nevada Supreme Court held that FTB was not entitled to the statutory damages cap
for the fraud claim. This decision was overturned by the United States Supreme Court which held that
“[w]ith respect to damages awards greater than $50,000, the ordinary principles of Nevada law do not
conflict with California law, for both laws would grant immunity. Similarly, in respect to such amounts,
the policies underlying California law and Nevada's usual approach are not opposed; they are consistent.”33
31
32
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Despite requiring immunity for FTB in amounts over $50,000, the complete immunity from recovery that
California would provide is inconsistent with Nevada law.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the fraud damages with instructions for the district court to
enter the damages award in the amount of $50,000, and reversed the award for prejudgment interest because
it would cause the total award to exceed $50,000. Because the statutory cap does not include awards for
attorney fees, upon remand the district court must make a determination as to fees and costs.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
To recover on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove “(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant; (2) intent to cause emotional distress or
reckless disregard for causing emotional distress; (3) that the plaintiff actually suffered extreme or severe
emotional distress; and (4) causation.”34 The plaintiff must prove this by setting forth “objectively verifiable
indicia” to establish that the plaintiff “actually suffered extreme or severe emotional distress.”35
Hyatt refused to disclose his medical records during discovery, and was accordingly precluded from
presenting medical evidence of severe emotional distress at trial. However, Hyatt did present evidence of
emotional distress including testimony from his son and friends describing the changes they observed in
Hyatt’s behavior and health over the course of the audits. The jury found in favor of Hyatt, awarding him
$82 million in damages for emotional distress.
FTB argued that without medical evidence, Hyatt lacked objectively verifiable evidence to establish
severe emotional distress. Hyatt responded that testimony from his friends and family sufficed as objective
proof of the severe emotional distress, specifically because of the severity of the treatment he endured from
FTB.
The Restatement provides for a sliding-scale approach where an IIED claim with an increased
severity of conduct requiring less proof that emotional distress was suffered.36 In many cases, outrageous
conduct can serve as strong evidence that emotional distress existed. Nevada previously impliedly
recognized the sliding-scale approach, but formally adopted it here.
Under this approach, medical evidence is one method of establishing severe emotional distress
under an IIED claim, but other objectively verifiable evidence is acceptable when the defendant’s conduct
is more extreme. The more egregious the conduct, the less evidence of physical injury is required.
Here, Hyatt presented evidence of FTB’s extreme conduct: the evidence that the auditor made
disparaging comments about Hyatt and was determined to impose assessments upon him, the disclosure of
Hyatt’s personal information which it had promised to keep confidential, the delay of proceedings for
eleven years—resulting in daily interest charges of $8,000. The Court concluded that these facts show that
the case was at the extreme end of the sliding scale, warranting less information necessary to prove Hyatt’s
emotional distress. Hyatt’s testimony from three different individuals as to how FTB’s treatment affected
Hyatt both physically and emotionally sufficed as evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine
that Hyatt suffered severe emotional distress.
Trial errors at district court
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FTB argued that the trial court committed multiple evidentiary and jury instruction errors, and that
consequently the jury’s award should be reversed. FTB claimed that the district court permitted evidence
and a jury instruction which allowed a determination as to whether the audits were properly decided. The
Court reviewed the admissibility of evidence as well as the jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.
Evidence improperly permitted challenging audits' conclusions
FTB argued that the district court erred in allowing Hyatt to present witnesses that focused on
whether the audits’ determinations were correct. Both Hyatt’s tax accountant and tax attorney who
represented him during the audits testified as to their cooperation with the audit process. Additionally, an
expert tax attorney witness testified that Hyatt’s representatives cooperated during the investigations. An
expert witness also testified about the lifestyles of wealthy people in order to refute FTB’s allegations that
it was “implausible” that Hyatt lived in a low-income apartment in Las Vegas without security. Finally, an
expert witness and former FTB agent testified regarding audit procedures, specifically discussing how FTB
analyzed the information obtained the audits and challenging the results reached by FTB. FTB also argued
that Hyatt’s assertions regarding an alleged calculation error about the amount of taxable income was an
explicit attempt to challenge the conclusions of the audits. Hyatt asserted that rather than challenging the
audits, his evidence showed that the audits were conducted in bad faith and to extort a settlement.
The Court held that while much of Hyatt’s evidence was within the parameters set, several instances
violated the restriction against considering the audits’ determinations. These included the aforementioned
testimony challenging aspects of the fraud penalties, evidence challenging an alleged mathematical error in
the amount of income taxed, testimony challenging whether an auditor improperly weighted the credibility
of estranged family members, and testimony questioning whether the auditor correctly determined certain
information was not relevant.
Without first establishing that the audits’ determinations were incorrect, the expert testimony
regarding fraud and FTB’s alleged bad faith conduct had no utility. The testimony instead went to the
audits’ correctness, and it was thus an abuse of discretion for the district court to permit its admittance.
Jury instruction permitting consideration of audits' determinations
FTB argued that the district court erroneously instructed the jury to improperly consider FTB’s
audit determinations. Although an early version of the jury instructions told the jury not to consider the
appropriateness of the audits’ results, the final instruction was somehow altered with the revised version
stating:
There is nothing in the correct Jury Instruction No. 24 that would prevent you during your
deliberations from considering the appropriateness or correctness of the analysis
conducted by the FTB employees in reaching its residency determination and conclusion.
There is nothing in Jury Instruction No. 24 that would prevent Malcolm Jumulet37 from
rendering an opinion about the appropriateness or correctness of the analysis conducted
by FTB employees in reaching its residency determinations and conclusions.
The Court held that this instruction violated the jurisdictional limit imposed by the district court
and allowed the jury to consider the “appropriateness or correctness of the analysis conducted by the FTB
employees in reaching its residency determination and conclusion.” Thus, the district court abused its
discretion in giving this jury instruction.
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Exclusion of evidence to rebut adverse inference
FTB also challenged the district court’s exclusion of evidence which was intended to rebut an
adverse inference sanction for spoliation of evidence. In 1999, during the litigation’s pendency, FTB
changed email servers—subsequently destroying backup tapes. FTB sent emails to employees prior to the
change, requesting that they print or save any emails related to Hyatt’s case. FTB did make backup tapes
of some emails which, at some point, were overwritten. When Hyatt requested discovery of the backup
tapes and found they had been deleted, he filed a pretrial motion requesting sanctions against FTB. The
district court ruled in favor of Hyatt and determined it would give an adverse jury instructing allowing the
jury to infer that evidence negligently destroyed by a party would have been harmful to that party.
FTB attempted to rebut the adverse inference by introducing evidence explaining it had taken steps
to preserve relevant emails prior to the server change. Hyatt argued that this was a mere attempt to reargue
the evidence spoliation, and that in order to rebut the inference FTB must show that the destroyed evidence
was not harmful. The district court agreed with Hyatt and excluded the evidence.
A district court may either impose a rebuttable presumption when evidence was willfully destroyed,
where the burden shifts to the spoliating party to show that the destroyed evidence was not unfavorable. If
the party fails to rebut this presumption, the jury may assume the evidence was not favorable to the
destroying party. A district court may also impose a permissible adverse inference when evidence was
negligently destroyed. This lesser inference does not shift the burden of proof and allows the fact-finder to
determine, based on other evidence, that a fact exists.
Here, because the district court concluded that FTB’s destruction of the evidence was negligent,
the lesser adverse inference was applicable, and the burden did not shift to FTB. However, FTB should
have been allowed to rebut the adverse evidence by explaining the steps it took to preserve the relevant
emails and thus demonstrate that the destroyed information was not harmful to FTB. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence and the court reversed the ruling.
Other evidentiary errors
FTB also challenged the district court’s exclusion of evidence regarding Hyatt’s audit by the IRS
and the loss of his patent through a legal challenge to the validity of the patent, both of which occurred
during the period for which Hyatt claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hyatt asserts that the
district court’s exclusion was proper as the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.
The Court concluded that the information excluded was not unfairly prejudicial, and the probative
value as to the IIED claim outweighed the prejudicial value. Therefore, the district court abused its
discretion in excluding this evidence.
Evidentiary and jury instruction errors do not warrant reversal
After determining that the district court abused its discretion in the aforementioned evidentiary and
jury instructions, the Court turned to whether the errors warranted reversal and remand on the IIED claim.
Based on the newly-implemented sliding-scale approach, the Court concluded that FTB failed to
show that but for the trial errors, a different result could have been reached as to liability. The evidence
supported a damages award up to the $50,000 damages cap. The award was reversed with instructions for
the district court to enter a damages award for Hyatt’s IIED claim in the amount of $50,000. This amount
was the maximum allowed by law, and Hyatt was therefore not entitled to prejudgment interest.

On the question of punitive damages, the district court allowed the issue to go to the jury who found
in favor of Hyatt, awarding him $250 million. Punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant’s
wrongful conduct, but are not allowed in Nevada against government entities unless expressly authorized
by statute. FTB argued that it is entitled to immunity from punitive damages because of comity principles,
while Hyatt maintained that punitive damages are allowable against an out-of-state government entity
because Nevada has a statute allowing such damages.
Under comity principles, the court extended FTB the protections of California immunity to the
same degree it would provide immunity to Nevada government entity. Therefore, FTB was immune from
punitive damages and this portion of the district court’s judgment was reversed.
Costs
After reversing judgements on several of Hyatt’s tort causes of action, the district court’s cost
awards were also reversed. The costs issue was remanded for determination which party prevailed and as
to the proper amount of costs to award.
FTB also challenged the procedure used by the district court in awarding costs. After trial, Hyatt
moved for costs and the district court assigned the issue to a special master who issued a recommendation
of a $2.5 million costs award after fifteen months of discovery. FTB argued that Hyatt was improperly
allowed to submit documentation regarding his costs after the deadline. The court held that the five-day
time limit under NRS 18.11038 is not jurisdictional because the statute allows for “such further time as the
court or judge may grant” to submit the costs documentation.39 Thus, the Court rejected FTB’s assertion
that Hyatt was improperly allowed to submit his costs memorandum.
FTB also challenged the district court’s refusal to allow FTB to file an objection to the special
master’s recommendation. The district court used NRCP 53(e)(3)40 to determine that no challenge to the
recommendation was permitted because there was a jury trial. However, although there was a jury trial, the
costs issue was not placed before a jury and therefore NRCP 53(e)(2)41 applied. Thus, the district court
erred in refusing to allow FTB to file an objection.
The issue was remanded to the district court to determine whether Hyatt is still entitled to costs. If
so, the district court must allow FTB to file an objection to the report prior to entering a cost award.
Hyatt's cross-appeal
The final issue concerned Hyatt’s cross-appeal challenging the district court’s summary judgment
ruling preventing him from seeking economic damages as part of his recovery for the intentional tort claims.
Hyatt argued that FTB sent letters to two Japanese companies with whom Hyatt had patentlicensing agreements which then alerted the businesses to the audits. Hyatt theorized that this disclosure
caused millions of dollars in potential licensing revenue because the Japanese market ceased to do further
business with him. The district court granted FTB’s motion for summary judgment precluding Hyatt from
seeking economic loss damages, agreeing that Hyatt lacked sufficient evidence to present to the jury.
Hyatt wished to set forth a chain of events, established only by circumstantial evidence. However,
Hyatt offered only inferences to support each step, rather than evidence proving each step in the chain
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occurred. Because Hyatt did not properly support his claim for economic damages with circumstantial
evidence, summary judgment was proper, and the district court’s decision was affirmed.
Conclusion
While discretionary-function immunity does not apply to intentional torts, FTB was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on all Hyatt’s causes of action except for fraud and IIED. Evidence supported
a judgment of $50,000 on Hyatt’s IIED claim, but he cannot recover for prejudgment interest as it would
exceed the statutory cap. Hyatt also was precluded from recovering for punitive damages. The district
court’s judgement was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cost awards were reversed and remanded
for a new determination of attorney’s fees and costs. The district court’s prior summary judgement on
Hyatt’s cross-appeal was also affirmed.

